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AN UNINVITED GUEST: THE FEDERAL DEATH
PENALTY AND THE MASSACHUSETTS PROSECUTION
OF NURSE KRISTEN GILBERT
John P. Cunningham *
I. INTRODUCTION
These seven victims, ladies and gentlemen, were veter-
ans. They protected our country during war and peace.
They were vulnerable, due to their physical and mental
illnesses. Some were seriously ill. And some had no fam-
ily. And because of that ... they were the perfect victims.
And when Kristen Gilbert decided to kill them . . . she
used the perfect poison. I
Theirs was a vicious and macabre death, foisted upon their de-
fenseless bodies by the malevolent and calculated machinations of
a serial killer. Of all the ironies, it was unfathomable that evil
would lurk between the walls of a sanctuary reserved for those
who, after serving their country, arrived for some degree of heal-
ing, security, and, perhaps most importantly, serenity. Yet, de-
* Senior Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice. B.A., 1991,
College of William and Mary; J.D., 1999 (with honors), University of Richmond School of
Law (Editor-in-Chief of the University of Richmond Law Review). The author has pub-
lished two previous articles on the federal death penalty: The Federal Death Penalty
Erupts: High Profile McVeigh Execution Underscores Sanction's Inherent Resiliency, 12
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 303 (2002); and Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations
and Realities of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939 (1998).
The author would like to thank Nick Cannon, Mohsin Reza, and the staff of the Uni-
versity of Richmond Law Review for their interest in and support of this article. The views
expressed in this writing do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Justice
or the United States.
1. M. WILLIAM PHELPS, PERFECT POISON: A FEMALE SERIAL KILLER'S DEADLY
MEDICINE 9 (2003) (quoting statement of Assistant United States Attorney Ariane Vuono
to the jury during the trial of Kristen Gilbert); see also Fred Contrada, Newest State Ap-
peals Court Justice Is One Tough Cookie, THE REPUBLICAN, Mar. 22, 2006, at 17, available
at 2006 WLNR 4984131 (quoting portion of same statement by Ms. Vuono).
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spite rampant rumors, ghastly allegations, and disquieting coin-
cidences, a narcissistic sociopath2 on the warpath of death
roamed the hospital floors of the Northampton Veterans Affairs
Medical Center ("VAMC") in Leeds, Massachusetts in the mid-
1990s, preying on the ill. There, wrapped in a shroud of suspicion,
but somehow immune from formal accusation, homicidal nurse
Kristen Gilbert, wielding the deadly yet plentiful agent epineph-
rine-her weapon of choice-left a trail of corpses. One by one,
this "shell of a human being,"3 an "angel of death,"4 methodically
flushed the intravenous lines of ailing American veterans with
synthetic adrenaline until their innocent hearts raced, and then
stopped-snuffing precious life as if it were a cigarette butt.
It would be several years before this rapacious "angel of death,"
as she was (at first) facetiously referred to by colleagues,5 was
brought to justice before a jury of her peers in the Springfield Di-
vision of the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts. Moreover, the path to finality in the case had a gruel-
ing upward trajectory, littered with morbid factual twists,
inextricable legal hurdles, conflicted expert testimony, and plenty
of political hand-wringing for good measure. Indeed, Judge Mi-
chael A. Ponsor, the perspicacious jurist who shepherded the
prosecution of Kristen Gilbert from the bench and wrote all but
one of the reported opinions in the criminal case, openly rued the
whole affair as "the most complicated and stressful thing [he had]
ever done."6
Yet, somehow, despite all this, on March 26, 2001, after a day
and a half of deliberations during the penalty phase of the federal
2. Interview by Kelly M. Pyrek with M. William Phelps, Author of Perfect Poison: A
Female Serial Killer's Deadly Medicine, FORENSIC NURSE MAGAZINE, http://www.forensic
nursemag.com/webx/391webxl.html [hereinafter Pyrek Interview] (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
3. Elizabeth Mehren, Ex-VA Nurse is Spared Death Penalty; Courts: Federal Jury
Hands Down Life Sentence to Woman Convicted of Fatally Injecting Patients with Heart
Stimulant, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2001, at 5, available at 2001 WLNR 10497065 (reporting
statement by Assistant United States Attorney William Welch that Gilbert was a "shell of
a human being" who murdered because 'she enjoyed the drama of impending death").
4. Id. (stating that some of Gilbert's colleagues at the VAMC dubbed her "the angel
of death"); Pyrek Interview, supra note 2.
5. See Pyrek Interview, supra note 2.
6. Michael A. Ponsor, Life, Death and Uncertainty: To the Judge in Charge, the Mur-
der Trial of Kristen Gilbert Offered an Unsettling Lesson--and Inescapable Conclusion-
About the Ultimate Cost of the Death Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2001, at D2, avail-
able at 2001 WLNR 2280523.
[Vol. 41:969
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
murder trial,7 with jurors deadlocked and, thus, the option of im-
posing the federal death penalty foreclosed,' the trial, which
spanned the fall and winter of 2000 through 2001, came to an
end.9 Judge Ponsor then dutifully meted out the "only remaining
possible sentence" to Gilbert-mandatory life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. 0 Shortly thereafter, Gilbert was
transferred to a high-security federal facility in Texas to be im-
prisoned until her natural death." Interestingly, had the jury
somehow avoided deadlock and recommended the death penalty,
Gilbert would have been the only woman on death row in the
United States at that moment in time. 12 "Ironically ... she would
[have] die[d] in the same manner as she had killed: by lethal in-
jection." 3 But this was not to be.14
With this backdrop, the intent of this article is to examine
various aspects of the prosecution of Kristen Gilbert with an eye
toward spotlighting treatment of the federal death penalty in a
state without capital punishment. To establish a foundation, Part
II of this piece surveys the salient facts of the case, underscoring
the repugnant nature of both the crimes and the perpetrator.
Part III then discusses two reported opinions issued during the
prosecution, each selected for its unique significance in a case of
seminal importance to death penalty jurisprudence. Part IV illu-
minates the double entendre in the title of this article by provid-
ing a glimpse into gender, sovereignty, and other hot-button is-
sues arising when an "uninvited" federal sanction infiltrates a
Massachusetts prosecution. Finally, Part V concludes by com-
mending presiding Judge Ponsor for dispensing some "pretty good
7. Id.
8. Eileen McNamara, Imperfect Norm, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2004, at B1, avail-
able at 2004 WLNR 3571988.
9. John Brigham, Unusual Punishment: The Federal Death Penalty in the United
States, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 195, 195 (2004).
10. Ponsor, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. Mehren, supra note 3.
13. PHELPS, supra note 1, at 385.
14. Punctuating the bizarre disposition of Kristen Gilbert's case was her previous ar-
rest in October 1996, and subsequent 1998 conviction, for making a telephone bomb threat
to the VAMC, causing its evacuation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e), while she was being
investigated for the murder of several patients. See United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152,
153 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming Gilbert's trial court conviction for bomb threat); see also Cut-
ting v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219 (D. Mass. 2002) (confirming date of Gil-
bert's arrest for the bomb threat); United States v. Gilbert, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D. Mass.
2000) (confirming date of Gilbert's conviction for the bomb threat).
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justice" in a mammoth case besieged with issues of immeasurable
consequence.
II. AN "ANGEL OF DEATH" AMONG THE AILING
The perpetrators are quiet. The victims are quiet. The kill-
ings are quiet.15
'Gilbert was employed as a nurse at the Northampton VAMC in
Leeds, Massachusetts from March 1989 through February 1996.
At all times relevant to this article, she was assigned to Ward C
of the hospital where she worked four days a week from late af-
ternoon to midnight.'6 Ward C houses mostly chronically ill pa-
tients along with the hospital's intensive care unit. 17
Beginning in the summer of 1995, Gilbert befriended a man
named James Perrault, a hospital police officer whose work
schedule corresponded with Gilbert's and whose duties required
him to respond to medical emergencies in Ward C.' 8 At the time
she met Perrault, Gilbert was married to Glenn Gilbert, with
whom she had two children, both boys. Nonetheless, by the fall of
1995, she was having an extramarital affair with Perrault.19
During Gilbert's relationship with Perrault, which continued
until she terminated her employment at the VAMC in February
1996, Gilbert's co-workers noticed a significant increase in the
number of fatalities and medical emergencies in Ward C.' 0 Mem-
bers of the VAMC staff also perceived a rise in the hospital's pro-
curement of the drug epinephrine." Concomitantly, Gilbert's col-
15. James M. Thunder, Quiet Killings in Medical Facilities: Detection & Prevention,
18 IssuEs L. & MED. 211, 219 (2003) (describing the harrowing nature of "quiet killings"
by employees in medical facilities, including those carried out by Kristen Gilbert). While
an extensive look at the phenomenon of "quiet killings" in hospitals throughout the United
States is beyond the scope of this writing, James Thunder's article, cited in this footnote,
provides a comprehensive survey of this significant problem with the aspiration of foment-
ing "robust debate over improving methods of detecting and preventing such killings." Id.
at 211. Mr. Thunder also introduces a proposed paradigm for improving the prevention
and detection of these killings. See generally id. at 230-36.
16. United States v. Gilbert, 229 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2000).
17. Id.






leagues began reporting to superiors that they suspected she was
surreptitiously removing vials of the drug from a locked cabinet
in the critical care unit of the VAMC.22
The suspicions of nefarious behavior, coupled with the unset-
tling number of patient deaths, culminated in a chilling moniker,
bestowed upon Gilbert by staff members at the hospital-the "an-
gel of death."23 And ultimately, her colleagues' perceptions
prompted an investigation by the Office of Healthcare Inspections
of the Department of Veterans Affairs, which "concluded that
there was no evidence that any VAMC employee had intention-
ally harmed patients," and then a criminal investigation that led
to Gilbert's arrest.
24
During the course of the criminal investigation, Gilbert placed
a series of anonymous, threatening calls to the VAMC. In one of
these calls, she made a false bomb threat for which she was even-
tually convicted. 2' Gilbert also directly harassed and threatened
Perrault, after he ended the relationship and agreed to cooperate
with authorities. 26 She even expressed anger towards certain co-
workers who cooperated with the criminal investigation but
would not speak with her hand-picked private investigator.27
The fact that Massachusetts had no death penalty did not pre-
clude the Department of Justice from making a calculated deci-
sion to prosecute Gilbert under the federal death penalty. United
States Attorney Donald Stern submitted a notice of intention to
seek the death penalty, which stated that over thirty-seven men
died during Gilbert's shifts between January 1995 and February
1996.2' The method of execution proposed by the federal govern-
ment, like the defendant's modus operandi, was to be lethal injec-
tion. 29 The final indictment in the case was even more specific. It
alleged that, in the six-month period after her relationship with
22. Mehren, supra note 3.
23. See id.
24. Gilbert, 229 F.3d at 18.
25. See generally United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming Gil-
bert's trial court conviction for bomb threat).
26. Gilbert, 229 F.3d at 18.
27. Id.
28. Woman Faces Death Sentence in State Without that Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2000, at 124, available at 2000 WLNR 3228286 [hereinafter Woman Faces Death Sen-
tence].
29. Ponsor, supra note 6.
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Perrault began, Gilbert murdered four Ward C patients, and at-
tempted to kill three others, by poisoning them intravenously
with epinephrine (and insulin, in the case of one patient suffering
from diabetes).3"
Epinephrine, a clear and odorless liquid, is used to resuscitate
patients in cardiac arrest or anaphylactic shock, but may cause a
potentially fatal rapid or irregular heartbeat when administered
in excessive doses or to healthy patients.31 The four deaths and
three near-deaths tied to Gilbert all involved cardiac arrest.32
According to the government, Gilbert committed her crimes us-
ing a discreet yet meticulous modus operandi. She would take
epinephrine from Ward C's medical closet, enter the patient's
hospital room after other medical personnel had left, and then in-
ject the patient with a fatal dose of epinephrine under the pretext
of flushing his intravenous line with a saline solution, which itself
is an unusual and possibly dangerous practice.33 The govern-
ment's theory was that, by injecting non-prescribed medication
into patients already suffering from varying degrees of cardiac
troubles, Gilbert was able to generate medical crises, or "codes,"
during which she could claim she was responding to naturally-
occurring cardiac emergencies.34
Drawing on the concept of a "firebug," or arsonist, the govern-
ment posited that Gilbert orchestrated these "codes" not only be-
cause they brought her into contact with her lover, Perrault, but
also because they provided her with the attention and emergency
room freneticism she so coveted.35 More eerily, the prosecution
presented testimony during the trial that Gilbert occasionally
even killed her patients in order to leave work early. 36 The gov-
ernment's key evidence in support of its theory consisted of ad-
missions Gilbert made to Perrault, testimony by Gilbert's col-
leagues, and toxicological evidence collected from those she
murdered. 7





35. Id.; Brigham, supra note 9, at 195-96; Ponsor, supra note 6.
36. See, e.g., PHELPS, supra note 1, at 395; Brigham, supra note 9, at 196.
37. Gilbert, 229 F.3d at 18-19.
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Gilbert denied any fault for the deaths and other cardiac inci-
dents described in the indictment. Her experts, well-respected
and with impressive credentials,3" testified that the "deaths and
all but one of the near-deaths resulted from natural causes pre-
cipitated by preexisting medical conditions suffered by the alleged
victims."39 Her lawyers buttressed this testimony by maintaining
throughout the prosecution that the murdered men were elderly
and sick, and that there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged mur-
ders.4 ° The defense also proffered a searing indictment of the
medical care provided to veterans by the federal government
when a key witness admitted during testimony that he used
drugs while working at the hospital.4
Throughout the fall and winter of 2000 and into early 2001,
Gilbert was tried in federal court in Springfield, Massachusetts
before Judge Ponsor.4 2 At that point, Gilbert's trial marked only
the third time in American history that a federal death penalty
case went to trial in a state with no capital punishment of its
own.43 And because she committed the crimes at the Northamp-
ton VAMC, which is under the concurrent jurisdiction of Massa-
chusetts and the federal government, there was no question that
the federal death penalty statute applied.4
Judge Ponsor viewed the trial of Kristen Gilbert as a "classic
battle of experts."45 In terms of protocol and practicalities, how-
ever, the case was a "monster."46 It featured more than 250 mo-
tions before and during trial, the service of 1500 jury summonses,
70 witnesses, 52 days of trial testimony, over 200 exhibits (many
of them medical records running several hundred pages each),
38. Ponsor, supra note 6 ("The experts appointed to assist the defense team included.
* . three investigators, two toxicologists, a pathologist, two cardiologists, a nursing con-
sultant, a jury consultant, a venue analyst, two mitigation specialists .. .a statistician, a
neuropsychologist, a behavioral psychologist, a psychiatrist, an endocrinologist, and a
paralegal.").
39. Gilbert, 229 F.3d at 19.
40. Mehren, supra note 3.
41. See, e.g., PHELPS, supra note 1, at 396-97.
42. See Brigham, supra note 9, at 195.
43. Mehren, supra note 3.
44. Woman Faces Death Sentence, supra note 28; Eric Goldscheider, Fed's Death Pen-
alty Net Cast Ever Wider, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 2000, at El, available at 2000 WLNR
2279405; see also Brigham, supra note 9, at 199.
45. Ponsor, supra note 6.
46. Contrada, supra note 1.
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stacks of convoluted medical documents, and a stifling amount of
arcane science.47 Moreover, the "jury confronted concepts such as
'accelerated ideo-ventricular rhythm,' 'right bundle branch block-
age,' and 'contraction band necrosis."'48 Due to the raw complexity
of the evidence, Judge Ponsor permitted jurors to take notes, a
practice rarely invoked by trial judges.4 9
On February 21, 2001, evidence in the guilt phase concluded
and the jury began the first stage of deliberations. On March 14,
2001, exhausted5" and reportedly dehumanized, the jury returned
a verdict of guilty on three counts of first-degree murder, one
count of second-degree murder, and two counts of attempted
murder.5" Twelve days later, Judge Ponsor sentenced Gilbert to
"constructive" death-i.e., mandatory life imprisonment with no
chance of release. 2 While significant by any measure of punish-
ment, Judge Ponsor's sentence did not rise to the level of execu-
tion sought by the federal government, pursuant to which most of
the controversy in the case ensued.53 Both sides could claim a
"victory" of sorts.
III. NAVIGATING PRECARIOUS WATERS (WITH A RUSTY RUDDER)
I take no position on the death penalty per se. Our Consti-
tution gives Congress the duty to weigh the costs and bene-
fits of particular statutes, and I apply them as enacted.
47. Id.; Ponsor, supra note 6.
48. Ponsor, supra note 6.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Mehren, supra note 3.
52. Ponsor, supra note 6; see also Mehren, supra note 3.
53. As of this writing, Angela Johnson, a white female, is the only woman on federal
death row in Terre Haute, Indiana. On June 21, 2005, a federal jury in Iowa recommended
the death penalty for Johnson based on her role in aiding drug kingpin Dustin Honken in
four of five murders. Honken murdered two girls, their mother, and two other adults who
were set to testify against him in a federal drug case. Like Massachusetts, Iowa does not
have a state-sanctioned death penalty. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Federal Death Row Pris-
oners, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.php?scid=29&did=193 (last visited Apr. 10,
2007). Moreover, if Johnson's sentence is carried out, she would be the first woman exe-
cuted by the federal government since Bonnie Brown Heady, who died in a Missouri gas
chamber on December 18, 1953, after she was convicted of murdering a six-year-old boy.
Victor L. Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women, 33 FORDHAM URB.




Should another capital case come my way, I will again pre-
side, and perhaps find myself with the duty to order a de-
fendant put to death. I accept this. 4
While a cumulative analysis of all published opinions in the
Gilbert case is beyond the scope of this article, two reported opin-
ions issued by Judge Ponsor merit discussion as they lend context
to the big picture narrative of the Gilbert litigation and shed
some light on judicial treatment of the federal death penalty in a
state with no recent experience adjudicating capital punishment.
In the first opinion, Gilbert moved the court to dismiss most of
the counts in the federal grand jury indictment for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, arguing that the VAMC was not within the
jurisdiction of the United States.55 But the United States had
purchased the land upon which the VAMC sits in 1922.6 The his-
tory of the VAMC revealed, moreover, that the building was
opened in 1924, and the land in question was officially ceded to
the jurisdiction of the federal government in 1926 pursuant to
"public act." 7
Despite this history, Gilbert offered three reasons why she be-
lieved the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case:
first, the United States did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over
the property because it gained the land as a proprietor rather
than as a sovereign; second, the federal government failed to
comply with statutory requirements in Massachusetts for ceding
jurisdiction; and third, any jurisdiction obtained by the United
States reverted to the state in 1926 due to the terms of that year's
agreement, which, Gilbert submitted, conditioned acceptance by
the federal government on its use of the land for "national de-
fense."58
54. Ponsor, supra note 6 (reflecting on his judicial obligations in death penalty cases
in the aftermath of the Gilbert trial).
55. United States v. Gilbert, 94 F. Supp. 2d 157, 158 (D. Mass. 2000).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 158, 162-63. In July 1975, the Department of Veterans Affairs entered into
another agreement with the state, in which it offered to "retrocede" some of the federal
government's exclusive jurisdiction over the VAMC, thereby establishing concurrent juris-
diction between the United States and Massachusetts. Id. at 158-59.
58. Id. at 159.
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Citing 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)59 and Article I, § 8, Clause 17 of the
Constitution,6" which collectively establish the federal govern-
ment's jurisdiction over "[any lands reserved or acquired for the
use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction thereof' where the land is ceded with the consent of
the state, Judge Ponsor rejected Gilbert's arguments seriatim.6
Specifically, on the first issue of viewing the United States as a
proprietor, the court chided Gilbert for failing to cite any legal au-
thority, and then concluded that its own research revealed no
source to support the proposition that a state's consent must be
contemporaneous with the federal government's purchase of the
land at issue.62 Furthermore, Judge Ponsor found that the United
States, in 1926, accepted jurisdiction over the land where the
VAMC is housed.63
As to the faulty statutory requirement claim, Gilbert was, in ef-
fect, "hoisted by her own petard," as the court highlighted the fact
that her own research revealed files containing a copy of a certain
chapter of a pivotal "public act,"64 which incorporated a descrip-
tion of the full parcel purchased by the United States. This was
thus "sufficient" to satisfy any statutory requirement for filing a
"suitable plan" for the tract of land in question with the state
government.65
On Gilbert's third contention, pertaining to a section in the
"public act" at issue that conditioned acceptance of the land by
59. This statute, in part, states that the relevant jurisdiction for the specific type of
first degree murder alleged in the indictment against Gilbert includes
[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under
the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or
otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the
State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal,
dockyard, or other needful building.
18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (2000).
60. This specific clause of the United States Constitution "permits the United States
to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over lands within a State." Humble Pipe Line Co. v.
Waggonner, 376 U.S. 369, 371 (1964). It specifically provides that Congress shall have
power to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever ... over all Places pur-
chased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
61. Gilbert, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 159-62.
62. Id. at 160.
63. Id. at 161.




the United States in 1926 on its use in a "national defense" capac-
ity, Judge Ponsor found Gilbert's interpretation of this section
rendered the whole act incomprehensible.66 The court explained
that acceptance of Gilbert's "incongruent" reading of the provision
would have meant that the state both ceded jurisdiction of the
VAMC and then took it back on the same day.67 It also ruled that
the phrase "for purposes of national defense" in the "public act"
included the mission of a Veterans Administration hospital,
which, in Judge Ponsor's words, "obviously serves the interests of
national defense."68
After its analysis of Gilbert's three contentions, the court for-
mally held that "jurisdiction did not revert back to the Common-
wealth in 1926, but remained in the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States."69 The court then took judicial notice of the fact
that the United States had legal jurisdiction over the Gilbert case
due to the VAMC's placement within the territorial control of the
United States.7"
In the second opinion, Gilbert moved to strike portions of the
four nonstatutory aggravating factors that the federal govern-
ment proposed to offer as justification for the federal death pen-
alty-assuming, of course, that the trial eventually reached the
penalty stage.71 Gilbert specifically objected to portions of "Factor
2," entitled "[o]ther, charged and uncharged, acts of violence and
other offenses" and "Factor 3," entitled "[fluture dangerousness of
the defendant."7 2 Judge Ponsor couched the principal issue in this
dispute in somewhat dramatic terms: "what may a jury consider
in deciding whether a capital defendant should live or die?"73 In
doing this, he noted that Congress "has entrusted trial judges
both with substantial responsibility and with broad discretion to
act as guardians of the sentencing process."74
The court began its analysis of Gilbert's motion to strike with
an overview of the penalty phase in cases tried pursuant to the
66. Id. at 161-62.
67. Id. at 162.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 163.
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federal death penalty.75 Judge Ponsor noted that nonstatutory
aggravating factors "contain some of the last pieces of evidence
that may appear before the jury," and that they are considered
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial if and only if the
jury finds unanimously and "beyond a reasonable doubt" (1) that
the defendant "intentionally killed the victim" and (2) that at
least one statutory aggravating factor is present.
7 6
The court then outlined the three-part test that guides a fed-
eral court's discretion in evaluating nonstatutory aggravating fac-
tors: first, the information must be relevant; second, the informa-
tion must meet a "heightened standard of reliability" required by
the Supreme Court in death penalty cases; and third, even if
relevant and reliable, the probative value of the factors must not
be outweighed by the "danger of unfair prejudice to the defen-
dant, confusion of the issues, or a likelihood that the jury will be
misled."77
Judge Ponsor carefully reviewed proposed nonstatutory aggra-
vating "Factor 2," noting that it alleged uncharged violent con-
duct by Gilbert, linked Gilbert's on-duty presence to patient
deaths over the course of a six-year period at the VAMC, and
highlighted a prior conviction Gilbert had for making the bomb
threat to the VAMC while being investigated for patient deaths.7"
The uncharged violent conduct included Gilbert's alleged scalding
of a mentally retarded boy with hot bath water some eight years
prior to the VAMC crimes, along with an apparent assault of her
husband, Glenn Gilbert, with a large kitchen knife in 1988."9
Judge Ponsor ruled that neither of these first two allegations
passed muster under federal death penalty standards because
there was no evidence of actual injury in either situation; more-
over, given how far removed the incidents were, temporally
speaking, testimony would be unreliable."0
The court, did, however, opine that three other nonstatutory
aggravating incidents contained in "Factor 2" might be appropri-
ate for the jury's consideration in the penalty phase of the trial.
75. Id. at 149.
76. Id. at 149-50.
77. Id. at 150 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(a)(2) and 3593(c)).
78. Id. at 151.




One involved the allegation that Gilbert tried to murder her hus-
band in 1995 by lethal injection, around the same time the VAMC
murders were committed. This allegation was, in the court's
judgment, "comparable to those listed as statutory aggravating
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)." l A second allegation involved the
assault and attempted murder by poison of another patient at the
VAMC, in which the "gravity and relevance" of Gilbert's conduct
in the incident, in the court's opinion, would make it proper for
consideration at the penalty stage. 2 Regarding the third incident,
the court found that the government could introduce evidence re-
lating to Gilbert's conviction for making a bomb threat to the
VAMC because it required evacuation of patients, put people at
grave risk, and had already been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt in a court of law.8
3
Proposed nonstatutory aggravating "Factor 3," relating to fu-
ture dangerousness, included three allegations: (1) Gilbert tried
to obtain medication and medical equipment through theft and
false pretenses; (2) she abused her position as a nurse; and (3) in
certain instances she feigned being overmedicated. 4 While the
federal government maintained that these circumstances demon-
strated that defendant would be dangerous if sent to prison (as
opposed to being sentenced to death), the court disagreed. 5 The
court opined that it was "simply inconceivable that ... [Gilbert]
will ever have the remotest opportunity to obtain poison or medi-
cation" if convicted, and that the threat of Gilbert poisoning any-
one in a prison setting was "simply illusory."8 6 Consequently,
Judge Ponsor ruled that the evidence in these subparagraphs was
irrelevant to the question of future dangerousness and thus un-
suitable for the penalty stage. 7
The two remaining subparagraphs of proposed nonstatutory
aggravating "Factor 3" included an attempted breaking and en-
tering into the home of Gilbert's lover, James Perrault, and a
1996 incident where Gilbert supposedly threatened to stab her
husband and thereafter tore a telephone off the wall of her resi-
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 153-54.
83. Id. at 154.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 154-55.
87. See id. at 155.
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dence.8 8 On the former, Judge Ponsor failed to see the relevance
to the jury's ultimate decision on the death penalty, and marveled
at the government's inability to explain how the incident had any
nexus to defendant's putative "dangerousness" in prison.8 9 The
court therefore found the incident of insufficient gravity to be con-
sidered as a nonstatutory aggravating factor.9" On the latter, the
court categorized the incident as a "confused and angry outburst
during a heated domestic dispute" of "insufficient weight to count
towards the death penalty" and lacking sufficient gravity to be
considered by a jury determining whether Gilbert was to be exe-
cuted. 91
Viewed as a whole, this opinion represented a moderate victory
for Gilbert, given the court's rejection of several of the nonstatu-
tory aggravating factors presented by the government that were
at issue in this particular dispute. The opinion also, however,
demonstrated Judge Ponsor's ability to thread his way through
the federal death penalty's web of complexity with considerable
precision, efficiency, and confidence.
IV. A GLIMPSE INTO RACE, GENDER, AND STATE PREROGATIVES
Since [Gilbert] allegedly committed [her] crimes at a Vet-
erans Affairs Medical Center, the federal death penalty stat-
ute applied. The fact that Massachusetts has no death pen-
alty did not matter.92
While the dramatic bar was set exceedingly high by the appall-
ing nature of the killings at the VAMC in Leeds, Massachusetts
between 1995 and 1996, the actual prosecution of perpetrator
Kristen Gilbert, some years later, more than held its own in
terms of factual intrigue and legal maneuvering, as shown in
Parts II and III above. But beyond the idiosyncratic factual and
legal saga that was the Gilbert federal death penalty case, the
matter presented many tangential, but highly-charged, issues of









For example, the "special issue of women, and the matter of
race and ethnicity, bore particularly heavily on the Kristen Gil-
bert prosecution."93 Indeed, a relative dearth of women and Cau-
casians on federal death row raised suspicion that the govern-
ment felt intense pressure to prosecute Gilbert, a white female,
under the federal death penalty.94 Intuitively, Gilbert's attorneys
exploited this suspicion with a dose of legal ingenuity. In seeking
dismissal of the indictment, for instance, they argued, among
other things, that because minorities were sentenced to death in
a greater proportion than whites in the United States, Gilbert
was unfairly earmarked for capital prosecution by the Clinton
administration in an effort to bring some harmony to the imbal-
ance.95 Judge Ponsor, however, dismissed this contention out-
right. 9
6
Placing the microscope specifically on gender for the moment, it
is critical to understand that women are considerably less likely
than men to commit homicide and, in fact, account for only ten
percent of murder arrests in the United States.97 Moreover,
women receive a mere two percent of death penalty sentences im-
posed by trial courts, account for only 1.5 percent of those pres-
ently on death row, and represent a meager 1.1 percent of persons
executed in the United States since 1973.98 Accordingly, because
about 99% of those executed in the United States are men, female
offenders are seldom found on America's death rows. 99
93. Brigham, supra note 9, at 226.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 199-200. David Hoose, the lead attorney for the Gilbert defense team, com-
mented that the local district attorney was more than capable of prosecuting Gilbert for
the crimes she committed at the hospital and, in doing so, directly accused the federal gov-
ernment of improperly considering race in selecting Gilbert for capital punishment. He
argued that three quarters of suspects selected for federal death penalty treatment by the
federal government in the early 1990's were members of minority groups and, thus, Gil-
bert "make[s] the numbers look better." Woman Faces Death Sentence, supra note 28. See
generally United States v. Gilbert, 75 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D. Mass. 1999) (prohibiting dis-
covery in furtherance of Gilbert's contention that she was being singled out for reverse dis-
crimination to compensate for the disproportionate designation of black defendants in fed-
eral death penalty prosecutions).
96. Brigham, supra note 9, at 200.
97. Streib, supra note 53, at 620.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 609-10.
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In terms of gender disparity, it "appears that female offenders
have always been treated differently from male offenders in the
death penalty system, sometimes for reasons that are .. justifi-
able," but, at least in the view of one widely-published scholar on
the subject, "often simply because of sex bias."' ' This same ex-
pert on women and the death penalty, Professor Victor Streib,
deftly synopsizes the framework of possible sources of gender-
based disparate treatment in death penalty jurisprudence in the
following manner:
[A] brief sketch of the differential treatment of men and women in
our national death penalty system identifies two primary sources.
The first is probably unintentional and usually benign, in that some
factors in death penalty law and procedure may not intend to treat
women differently but nonetheless do have a disparate impact. Obvi-
ous examples are using the felony murder rule and a past record of
violent crime in considering the death sentence, both of which are
more likely to put a man on death row than a woman, albeit perhaps
for good reason. The second source of differential treatment may be
subconscious, but certainly it is not benign. Examples here are as-
sumptions that women who kill are more likely than men who kill to
have been acting under emotional disturbance or under the domina-
tion of their co-felons. These mitigating factors provide opportunity
for biases in favor of women defendants that are quite difficult to
support. 
101
A plausible and widely endorsed theory is simply that mitigat-
ing factors tend to benefit women more so than men.'02 Mitigating
factors include emotional trauma, submission to emotional or
physical dominance, overall character, and family background.' 3
As a general premise, some scholars submit that juries are more
apt to find "sympathetic factors" in the backgrounds of females
than males, especially in homicide trials.0 4 This may have some-
thing to do with the reality that women are less inclined to reti-
100. Id. at 612.
101. Id. at 619-20.
102. Janice L. Kopec, Avoiding a Death Sentence in the American Legal System: Get a
Woman To Do It, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 353, 357 (2003); see also Victor L. Streib, Gendering the
Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 462-
63 (2002).
103. Kopec, supra note 102, at 357; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (2000) (listing, among
others, impaired capacity, duress, participation level, prior criminal record, and emotional
disturbance as mitigating factors permissible for consideration under the federal death
penalty).
104. Streib, supra note 102, at 463.
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cence when the time comes to expose mitigating factors to judge
and jury in the heat of trial. 105
Indeed, the outcome of the Gilbert prosecution arguably embod-
ied the longstanding and widely-accepted proposition in death
penalty jurisprudence that "the burden of leaving behind mother-
less children presumably weighs more heavily on a jury than the
burden of leaving behind fatherless children.""0 6 By Judge Pon-
sor's own post-trial account, the most dramatic evidence of miti-
gating factors during the penalty phase of the trial came from
Gilbert's family members.'07 Gilbert's father, for example, showed
the jury pictures of his daughter as an infant, toddler, and young
mother.' 8 And both of the defendant's grandmothers ambled to
the stand, "recalling cookie-baking and quilt-making" with Gil-
bert, and explaining for the jury the debilitating impact her death
would ostensibly have on them.' 09
But most compelling, perhaps, was the penalty phase testi-
mony of Gilbert's former husband, who has custody of her two
children and appeared on behalf of the government during the
guilt phase of the prosecution. 0 In the earlier stage of the trial,
he testified, quite convincingly, that his ex-wife attempted to
murder him by poisoning his food."' In a reversal of fortune for
Gilbert, however, he submitted a statement during the penalty
phase of the trial, expressing his profound concern for his sons,
and the injury they would suffer if their mother were placed on
death row and ultimately executed." 2 His testimony probably
saved Gilbert's life.
Consider also that the formal decision on May 13, 1999, of
United States Attorney Donald Stern-via the authority of then-
Attorney General Janet Reno-to prosecute Gilbert under the
federal death penalty".3 enabled the government to pursue the ul-
timate punishment in a state without a capital punishment stat-
105. Id.
106. Kopec, supra note 102, at 357.
107. Ponsor, supra note 6.
108. Id.
109. Id. "As they spoke, Gilbert, just a few feet away, sobbed." Id.
110. Id.
111. Mehren, supra note 3.
112. Ponsor, supra note 6.
113. PHELPS, supra note 1, at 385.
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ute.14 Federal prosecutors managed to establish jurisdiction be-
cause the VAMC in Leeds, where Gilbert was employed, is a fed-
eral building.' Thus, while physically located in the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, it falls under concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction." 6 This decision was extraordinary. The last
time anyone had been executed in Massachusetts was in May of
1947 when thirty-four-year-old Edward Gertson and his thirty-
two-year-old accessory, Phillip Billeno, were convicted and then
electrocuted for the murder of Robert Williams." 7
Furthermore, at the time of Gilbert's crimes, Massachusetts
was one of twelve states in the nation without the death pen-
alty.118 Some commentators branded the government's decision to
prosecute the Gilbert case under the federal death penalty as
dismissive of state prerogatives and adverse to notions of local-
ized crime management-the latter, a somewhat reliable tenet of
traditional federalism.1 9 As a writer for the Boston Globe opined
shortly before the trial, such "'federalization' of cases . . . means
that no state will be able to declare itself a death penalty-free
zone." 2 ' Attorneys for Gilbert elevated this argument to excoria-
114. See, e.g., Goldscheider, supra note 44. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts invalidated the state's last capital punishment statute in 1984. Brigham, supra note
9, at 219. Historically speaking, however, Massachusetts
began phasing out the death penalty in the middle of the nineteenth century.
By 1840, milder punishment was being recommended by officials for all
crimes other than murder .... The [abundant] evocation of [the history of
abolition in the state] suggests a culture of remorse, and perhaps even a
sense of community, that is at the heart of the opposition to the death penalty
in New England and the Northeast. Michael and Robert Meeropol, who live
in Springfield, Massachusetts [where Kristen Gilbert was tried], are the sons
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed by the federal government
in the 1950s, and they are active in abolition circles.
Id. at 218-19 (citations omitted).
115. Brigham, supra note 9, at 199; Woman Faces Death Sentence, supra note 28; Gold-
scheider, supra note 44; supra Part III.
116. Brigham, supra note 9, at 199; Woman Faces Death Sentence, supra note 28; Gold-
scheider, supra note 44; supra Part III.
117. PHELPS, supra note 1, at 385.
118. Mehren, supra note 3; Woman Faces Death Sentence, supra note 28. At the time of
this writing, these same twelve states, plus the District of Columbia, continue to outlaw
capital punishment under state law: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Penalty Policy by State, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?did=121&scid=11 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (juxtaposing states and other
American institutions that have the death penalty-including the federal government and
the United States military-with states that do not).
119. See, e.g., Brigham, supra note 9, at 216; Goldscheider, supra note 44.
120. Goldscheider, supra note 44.
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tion of the federal government, contending that the "continual
federalization of criminal law" was a "retrograde development"
that was "politically driven" and "leading to a huge expansion of
federal crimes that were perfectly well handled by the states." 2 '
To grasp the gravamen of such frustrations, one must consider
that federalism in the United States is a "mixed sovereignty with
local and national aspects that exists in a vaguely constituted po-
litical and legal space. " 112 With specific regard to the federal
death penalty sanction, the power exercised by the national gov-
ernment was only recently reauthorized and is not necessarily in
accord with local and state sentiment. 1
23
Only six short years before the Gilbert trial, President Clinton
signed the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 ("FDPA")124 into
law as part of the comprehensive Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act. 125 The FDPA vastly expanded the authority of
the federal government "to seek the death penalty for defendants
accused of certain crimes within federal court jurisdiction."126
With this expansion, the federal death penalty encompassed
about sixty offenses, including murder in a federal facility or dur-
ing an attack on a federal facility, kidnapping resulting in death,
rape or child molestation resulting in death, genocide, murder
during a drug-related drive-by shooting, and many others. 127 This
enlargement of federal jurisdiction raised the spectre of turf wars
between the federal government and the states and, conse-
quently, the prospect of prosecutorial jockeying in capital pun-
ishment cases invoking "dual sovereignty."
A basic principle of federalism in "dual sovereignty" matters,
which now include many cases with death penalty implications, is
that the prosecution should be managed by the most local juris-
diction.128 While the number of prisoners on federal death row is
121. Woman Faces Death Sentence, supra note 28.
122. Brigham, supra note 9, at 196.
123. Id. at 196-97.
124. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (1994).
125. See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (federal death penalty provisions codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
126. John P. Cunningham, Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations and Realities of
the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 939 (1998).
127. Id. at 940, 952-56.
128. Brigham, supra note 9, at 216.
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negligible vis-A-vis those on state death rows, Gilbert's attorneys,
and others, argue that a "federalization" of the death penalty is in
the works given the steady increase in federal prosecutions of
capital cases in recent years.129 Essentially, these commentators
allege that the federal government is "encouraging executions
with little regard for the logics of federalism.""13
Federal executions, however, are uncommon, and most of the
states sending prisoners to federal death row have their own ver-
sion of the death penalty. 131 In these states, residents are condi-
tioned to the idea of executing those convicted of the most heinous
crimes. 2 But in states such as Massachusetts, without the death
penalty, the prospect of imposition of the sanction by the federal
government is unusual, if not outright foreign, and arguably sad-
dles the local citizenry with a legal and political quagmire
wrought with Byzantine questions of federalism, sovereignty, and
state prerogatives. 1 33
Moreover, Massachusetts has been particularly robust in its
historical opposition to the death penalty. 134 Such "resistant"
states are said to have a "special salience" in national death pen-
alty politics, where forces are constantly battling to enable the
sanction for prosecutors, often in jurisdictions without the pun-
ishment.135 Indeed, with no recent history of capital punishment,
even the idea of prosecuting Gilbert under the federal death pen-
alty statute was "a very big deal" to citizens of Massachusetts. 
136
This may help explain why a large percentage of summoned ju-
rors in the Gilbert case reportedly "exhibited a somber demeanor"
throughout voir dire proceedings.' 37 And it certainly provides in-
sight into why many in Massachusetts, including prominent
members of the press, viewed the Gilbert prosecution with zeal-
ous cynicism and as little more than a federal encroachment on
129. Id. at 212.
130. Id. at 216. See generally Goldscheider, supra note 44.
131. Brigham, supra note 9, at 217.
132. Id.
133. See generally id. at 217-18.
134. Id. at 218-21 (providing historical context for the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts's longtime opposition to the death penalty).
135. Id. at 220.




state prerogatives designed to assuage abolitionists and prepare
the state for future executions.138
V. CONCLUSION
I have a fantasy of putting a big sign over the door to the
federal courthouse in Springfield, which says: "Ponsor's
Pretty Good Justice."1
39
In the end, whatever your perspective on capital punishment,
and however you may feel about traditional notions of gender,
race, and federalism in the context of federal death penalty juris-
prudence, the ineluctable conclusion to the Gilbert saga is that an
objective form of justice was served-"pretty good justice," as
Judge Ponsor would put it. 140
The legal, political, and social quandaries permeating the case
were inarguably extraordinary and sometimes insoluble. The evi-
dence presented during the trial was grisly, complex, voluminous,
and often overwhelming (for judge, jury, lawyers, families, and
defendant alike).,4 1 The victims-of all the individuals worthy of
compassion and empathy-were, alas, defenseless American vet-
erans. And after all this, a detestable and homicidal "angel of
death," who ironically was entrusted to serve as a "guardian of
life," sits in prison until her natural death, without even the
faintest prospects for release.
But it is never quite this simple. We should know, or at least
ask, whose "pretty good justice" is this? Does it belong to the
families of the victims? How about the citizens of Massachusetts?
Perhaps even the federal government, given that they secured a
conviction, albeit at a lesser punitive threshold than they had
hoped? We should also consider death penalty abolitionists, who,
in their eyes, managed to shield Massachusetts, at least tempo-
rarily, from what they view as an abhorrent and deplorable pen-
138. See, e.g., Goldscheider, supra note 44.
139. McNamara, supra note 8.
140. Id.
141. During the trial there were "three snow days, four sick days, and three medical
emergency days; the defendant and two of the jurors got the flu, and one of the defense
lawyers was briefly hospitalized with chest pains." Ponsor, supra note 6.
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alty. 4 1 On the other hand, maybe supporters of capital punish-
ment won the day, having witnessed the power of the "ultimate
sanction" to cross lines of state sovereignty and challenge state
prerogatives.
Clearly there is no definitive answer to such an obvious rhe-
torical query. Any response that could in fact be strewn together
would invariably subsume elements of each of the Gilbert case's
many "constituents." What can affirmatively be stated in re-
sponse to the question, however, is that Judge Michael Ponsor
dispensed his unique brand of "pretty good justice" throughout
this case, marked by his legal acumen, evenhandedness, and en-
viable tenacity. Thus, his philosophy on the otherwise amorphous
concept of "pretty good justice" carries significant weight here,
and bears repeating, with the hope that its elegant simplicity
may shed light on the idea of "justice" contemplated on these
pages:
By suggesting that what I try to dispense is "pretty good" justice I
don't mean that I have a casual or halfhearted attitude toward my
work. Playing a role in a system that ultimately provides "pretty
good justice" means constantly attempting to dispense justice that is
as good as it possibly can be. It is incredibly difficult, incredibly sub-
tle work. It is a stretch towards an ideal of perfect justice that can
never be reached. "Pretty good" justice is pretty darn hard. 1
43
Perhaps this is the best we can hope for in a federal death pen-
alty case like Kristen Gilbert's, the sheer magnitude of which the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had never before witnessed.
142. My use of the word "temporarily" is pregnant with meaning here. On December
23, 2003, a federal jury in Massachusetts recommended the execution of Gary Lee
Sampson, a drifter who confessed to carjacking and killing two men during a weeklong
rampage in July 2001. Shelly Murphy, Death for Sampson: Verdict Makes Him State's
First Since 1947 to Face Execution, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 24, 2003, at Al, available at 2003
WLNR 3417009; see also Laurel J. Sweet, Coward Killer Begs for Mercy: Sampson Wants
His Life Spared, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 5, 2006, at 2, available at 2006 WLNR 17279513.
His sentence marked the first time a capital punishment verdict had been imposed in a
federal death penalty prosecution in Massachusetts. See Murphy, supra. Furthermore, the
verdict means that Sampson, who currently sits on federal death row in Terre Haute,
Indiana, could become the first person to be executed for a crime in Massachusetts under
any death penalty statute since 1947. Id.
143. McNamara, supra note 8.
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